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ON JAPAN'S LIBERALIZATION OF 
TRADE AND EXCHANGE 
By Kiyoshi MATSUI* 
1. The Significance of Liberalization 
Since the end of last year, (1959) we have had enough of discussion 
appearing repeatedly in newspapers and magazines on the subject of the 
so-called liberalization of trade and exchange. We may as 'VeIl call it one 
of the most important current topics of today. However, the author rather 
wishes to consider here in this article the significance of the liberalization 
problem in the history of development of capitalism, not from such a stand-
point of viewing it as a current topic, but from a long-term viewpoint. 
If we characterise the significance of the current liberalization problem 
in one word, it is the liberalization under the state monopolistic capitalism. 
Today's liberalization has many different features from the free trade under 
pre-monopolistic capitalism. Firstly, the liberlization of today is not intended 
to eliminate the control over foreign exchange completely, neither· will it 
possible to eliminate it even if attempted. For instance, in the case of our 
country, what is called liberalization means an increased rate of the automatic 
approval system items (the A.A. system goods) in relation to the total foreign 
currency budget, and does not imply removal of the exchange control which 
consists of the foreign exchange concentration system, the foreign currency 
budget system and so forth. Secondly, it is not intended to carry out per-
fect liberlization all at once as is the case with the return to the interna-
. tional gold standard system, but is planned to effect liberalization gradually 
in an imperfect form. For example, the lifting of gold embargo carried out 
by our government in 1930 was nothing other than the return to the inter-
national gold standard system, and perfect liberalization was realized at one 
sweep. Not only the non-resident account and the resident account in the 
category of the working account, but also the capital account as well as the 
working account . were freed all at once. On the other hand, today's libera-
lization is designed to push on the liberalization gradually from the non-
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resident account to the resident account in the category of the working ac-
count, and from the working account to the capital account, while maintain-
ing the foreign exchange control system itself. 
Thirdly, the liberalization of today is the liberalization based on bloc 
economies, and it does not attempt to realize liberalization on a global scale 
at one strike. It is a good example that the European nations had formed 
the European Common Market, the Free Trade Association and other eco-
nomic blocs before they went ahead with liberalization. It may well be 
said that Japan's liberalization has a similar tendency, though in different 
form, as it is based on a political and military bloc known as the New 
Security Treaty system. 
In the fourth place, the liberalization of today is at issue with an im-
plicit understanding that the would-never-be-liberalized area or the socialist 
world economy shall be outside the question. In this sense alone, the liber-
lization under state monopolistic capitalism can hardly be perfect after all. 
Now, monopoly is a thing that came into the world as a child born 
from the negation of free competition originally. But even monopolistic 
capitalism can never be expected to eliminate free competition out as long 
as it remains capitalism. The coexistence of monopoly and free competi-
tion may be called a characteristic of monopolistic capitalism. In some phase 
of monopolistic capitalism will monopoly be fortified or even the state power 
will be called for at times, while in some other phase of it the scope of 
free competition will be enlarged on the contrary. In other words, in such 
a phase as war or panic monopoly will naturally be strengthened, while in 
the phase of economic prosperity or stability liberalization will rather be 
welco;ned. Today's liberalization is liberalization under such state monopo-
listic capitalism. Therefore, it will be necessary for us to give some consi-
derations on state monopolistic capitalism before we proceed to ascertain the 
significance of today's liberalization. 
Opinion is divided on the question as to when state monopolistic capi-
talism was formed in Japan, but it seems correct to consider that the time 
of formation dates after the great panic of 1930 and 1931. Of course it 
took a few more years before it took a definite form as an established insti-
tution, nevertheless it can be confirmed internationally that with the great 
panio as a turning point, state monopolistic capitalism was formed in an 
attempt to tide over the difficulties. To speak of our own case, there oc-
curred a number of events such as the outbreak of the Manchurian War, 
the reprohibition of the gold export, the enactment of the key industries 
control law in 1931 alone, all of which can be regarded as the signs mar-
king the formation of state monopolistic capitalism. And in the process of 
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formation of state monopolistic capitalism the control over foreign trade and 
exchange was tightened step by step. The first foreign exchange control 
was the prevention of capital flight law of June 1932. The reprohibition 
of the gold export enforced by the British Government in September 1931 
created an atmosphere of uneasiness fearing that Japan would have to follow 
the same step and place the gold export under a ban again. This uneasi-
ness among the Japanese resulted in the so-called flight of capital through 
, Selling yen, buying dollar' business, and the purchase of dollars totaled 510 
million yen worth for only about three months between September 21 and 
December 12. Owing to this, the gold reserves of our country run low to 
about one half, from 1042 million at the end of January 1930 to 430 mil-
lion yen at the end of January 1932, with the loss of about 600 million 
yen during the two-year period. It was under these circumstances that the 
gold embargo of December 13 was brought about. Although this measure 
could prevent the outflow of gold, it did not stop the flight of yen. In 
other words, free foreign trade and exchange was stilI maintained. There-
fore, the reprohibition of the gold export was the condition precedent of 
the negation of liberalization, but it did not mean the immediate cessation 
of free trade and exchange. Due to exchange speculation and capital flight, 
exchange rates dwindled. To cope with this situation, the national govern-
ment enacted "the Prevention of Capital Flight Law" in June 1932. The 
Article I of the law provides as follows: "the Government shall be able to 
prohibit or restrict by order such actions as buying and seIling of foreign 
currency and exchange, remittance to foreign countries, deposit, transaction 
and loan of foreign currency, purchase and sale and importation of securities 
or other obligations denominated in foreign currency, and giving of credit 
to residents abroad, whenever it sees the necessity of doing so for the 
purpose of keeping control over the inward and outward movements of 
capital according to the internal and external situations." Though the flight 
of capital could be prevented by this law, the downward tendency of foreign 
exchange was not arrested. And the primary reasons for that were exchange 
'speculation and exportation without exchange. Because these could not be 
prevented by the Prevention of Capital Flight Law, the need of enacting a 
more comprehensive law became pressing. Under these circumstances "the 
Foreign Exchange Control Law" of March 1933 came into being. Further 
in April of the same year "The Orders Based on the Foreign Exchange 
Control Law" was promulgated, and in January 1937 the Import Exchange 
License System was put in force. Through these measures, the wartime 
exchange control system became more and more tight. 
It is needless to say that the trade control was also exercised along 
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with it. In August 1937 which is the following month of the outbreak of 
the Sino-Japanese War, "the Law Concerning the Adjustment of Trade and 
Industries Concerned" and "the Trade Association Law" were promulgated. 
The former consists (1) the provisions concerning prohibition and restriction 
of import and export, and (2) the provisions concerning the control ever the 
exports and imports. Further on September 9 "the Law concerning Emer-
gency Measures for the Exports and Imports" tied up with "Emergency 
Funds Regulation Law" were also promulgated. According to this law, the 
Governme1')t could not only order by a departmental ordinance the prohibi-
tion or restriction of import and export, but also order restriction of output 
to the domestic industries or even interfere with a manufacturing process. 
These may well be called the direct intervention by the state power, that 
is, the trade control. 
With panic and war acting as impetus, the state monopolistic capitalism 
of Japan was formed, which was accompanied by the exchange-trade control 
system. Now, once state monopolistic capitalism is established, this becomes 
the structure of capitalism and will be maintained even after a direct tempo-
rary cause called war has gone. Therefore, it may be regarded as the struc-
ture of capitalism under constitutional crisis in a more general sense. The 
postwar state monopolistic capitalism can be apprehended as such. The 
deepening of crisis due to war took the form of accelerated unequal develop-
ment of capitalistic countries above all, and this brought about serious shor-
tage of dollars in many capitalistic countries. This phenomenon has become 
more and more distinct in Japan, too, from about 1948-49 when the so_ 
called 'economic independence' became a subject of discussion, disregarding 
the period during which Japan was under the direct rule of occupation forces 
immediately after the war. "The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade 
Control Law" which was legislated and promulgated by the Law No. 228 
on December 1, 1949 was intended to meet this situation. The Law under-
went amendment several times to this date, but its characteristics may be 
found in the following points. I) 
First, the foreign exchange concentration system. With some very spe-
cial exception, all the bills of exchange acquired by non-governmental busi-
nesses ought to be sold to the licensed foreign exchange banks. The banks 
sells the bills to the Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account in accordance 
with the prescribed regulations, and only a part of the bills may be retained 
in their hands. The bills retained by them, however, must be sold to the 
Special Account if so required by the Finance Ministry. 
1) Trade Relations Law, edited by Yoshio Kanazawa, Nippon Hyoronshinsha Co., P. 15. 
seq. 
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Second, the foreign exchange budget system. The Government draws 
up semi-annually the foreign exchange budget in order to determine a rude 
sketch of the apportionment of foreign exchange thus concentrated. As a 
rule, each exchange transaction should go through the legal procedure of 
permission, approval, certification or report, all of which are obligatory. To 
mention some of important acts that require such permission, there are: 
(1) Payment to or the receipt of payment from, foreign countries. 
(2) The occurrence, alteration, settlement, lapse, transfer or other kinds 
of disposition of credit and debt in foreign currency. 
(3) Securities and immovables dealings involving the international move-
ment of capital. 
(4) Conclusion of a service contract between a resident and a non-
resident. 
(5) Import and export of the means of payment. 
(6) Import and export of commodities. 
The control of the acts provided for from (1) through (5) may be called 
the exchange control in a narrow sense. (6) comes under the trade control 
in a narrow sense. As we have seen above, today's trade control chiefly 
depends upon the exchange control, and therefore, it may be regarded as a 
part of the exchange control. The exchange control in such a sense is the 
exchange control in a broad sense. 
The state monopolistic capitalism of postwar Japan has been accompa-
nied by such a exchange and trade control system during the' period from 
the end of 1949 till the end of 1959. How could the demand for liberaliza-
tion come into being under such circumstances? To find the answer to this 
question, we have to review the development of domestic as well as inter-
national situations thereafter even if briefly. 
2. The Progress of the Demand for Liberalization 
It was already stated that state monopolistic capitalism would also be 
unable to eliminate economic free competition thoroughly. Especially in such 
a phase where a nation's economy shows a sort of stability, the voice for 
liberalization will be heard strongly. With the ending of the World War 
II, the capitalist world set up the International Monetary Fund and the 
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and it may well be 
said that the goal of these international organizations is the liberalization of 
the international economy in a sense. Japan joined the International Mo-
netary Fund in 1952, and became a member country of the Gatt (General 
Agreements for Tariffs and Trade) in 1955. This would mean to other 
nations that Japan endorsed the goal of these international organizations and 
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promised her cooperation with other member countries in liberalization. In 
spite of the fact that such a demand for liberalization already existed ever 
since the ending of the last war, it has long been prevented from being 
realized by the very factor which we referred to in the foregoing. That is, 
the accelerated unequal development of capitalistic countries after the war 
or to put it in the concrete, the shortage of dollars in these countries. As 
long as these countries suffered from serious dollar deficit, it was inevitable 
to take restrictive measur'::s against the U.S. exchange and trade. 
Thus, the movement toward liberalization after the war first started 
within Europe, with the restriction on the U.S. left unchanged') The realiza-
tion of this movement took the form of the establishment of OEEC (Orga-
nization for European Economic Co-operation) in 1948. In July 1949, the 
executive Committee of OEEC proposed liberalization among European 
nations. Further, on September 18, 1950 the European Payments Union 
(EPU) was launched with the purpose of facilitating payments among the 
trading nations. It is also universally known that the European Common 
Market of six European continental countries, and the European Free Trade 
Association of seven nations with the United Kingdom as leader were formed 
as much stronger unions than those two co-operative bodies. These inter-
national organizations or blocs were primarily designed to contribute towards 
promoting the liberalization of exchange and trade within their respective 
spheres. As a matter of fact, they had been achieving considerably good 
results in regional liberalization program as a preliminary step before the 
liberalization policy was adopted toward the United States at the end of 
1958. 
It is interesting to note that the movement of liberalization towards the 
United States began to take concrete shape just about the time when the 
shortage of dollars in capitalistic countries began to improve. With the 
prosperous world economy of 1955-56 for a background, the world capitalism 
began to show a sort of of stability. Behind this was a relaxing tendency 
of unequal development among capitalistic countries. In the prosperous days 
of 1955-56, technological innovation and equipment and facilities investment 
based on technological innovation in the hitherto backwarded capitalistic 
countries like Japan and some European countries made rapid progress, and 
served to lessen the difference of productivity that had existed between the 
U.S. and these countries. In the United States, on the other hand, the 
gigantic military spending that accounts for a large portion of the total 
national expenditure has always been a latent cause of inflation, and the 
2) How will the liberalization of trade change Japan's economy r, edited by the Diamond, 
p. 13, seq. 
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cost inflation acted as a brake to arrest the growth of export. The inter-
national balance of payments of the United States produced a deficit of 
$ 3.5 billion in 1958, and another deficit of $ 3.7 billion in 1959. This 
meanS that the dollar holdings of Japan and European nations increased that 
much. If we look at the dollar holdings by major capitalistic countries at 
the end of 1959, each country shows a considerable amount as we see West 
Gennany $ 5,780 million, the United Kingdom $ 2,736 million, France $ 1, 
720 million, Switzerland $ 2,058 million, Japan $ 1,320 million.') It was 
under these circumstances that the exchangeability of currency of major 
countries was recovered and the so-called liberalization was put in effect in 
Europe at the end of 1958. Since that, the liberalization of trade and ex-
change progressed satisfactorily in Europe, and the rate of trade liberaliza-
tion as of 1960 is West Germany to 0 EEe 92 %, West Germany to the 
U.S. 85% ; the United Kingdom to OEEe 98%, the United Kingdom to 
the U.S. 95% ; France to OEEe 90%, France to the U.S. 90% ; Switzerland 
to OEEe 91 %, Switzerland to the U.S. 99%. 
The recovery of the exchangeability of currency of major European 
countries in 1958 brought considerable impact upon Japan's economy, but 
the liberalization program of Japan during the year 1959 made only slow 
progress at a snail's pace. Her liberalization ratio amounted to no more 
than 33.3% in the first,and.31.5% iQ the second half-year .. It was largely 
due to the pressure from the International Monetary Fund and the General 
Agreements on Tariffs Trade and that Japan detennined to take steps toward 
liberalization policy. That is, in September 1959 the Finance Minister Sato 
attended the general assembly of IMF, and the restrictive import policy of 
Japan became the target of bitter complaints and criticism by delegates from 
many countries. Also in October the GATT conference was held in Tokyo, 
and there a similar contention was repeated by the American delegate, 
Uudersecretary of State Douglas Dillon, and many other foreign delegates. 
Under these circumstances, the government issued announcement on Novem-
ber 11 as to 'future import liberalization policy', thereby Japan finally 
entered the stage of carrying out her liberalization policy. Then, at the end 
of December, the government decided on and announced a policy to put 
the importation of raw cotton and wool, the two major items of our import, 
under the automatic approval system from April 1961. But what has more 
epochal significance for liberalization was the so-called "Declaration of Li-
beralization" issued on January 12, 1960. To look into the contents of the 
declaration, the part dealing the liberalization of foreign exchange sets forth 
3) Of A proposal on the liberalization of trade and exchange", Hiroo Hirota, Economist, 
March 15. p. 41. 
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a policy covering the following six items: 
(I) Opening of the non-resident yen account. 
(2) Relaxation of the foreign exchange concentration system. 
(3) Easing of overseas travel restrictions. 
(4) Expanding the list of trading firms on reciprocal account. 
(5) Freer remittance to Japanese residents abroad. 
(6) Easing of miscellaneous remittance abroad. 
These are scheduled to be put in effect from about April when the new 
fiscal year begins. With respect to the liberalization of trade, this was the 
third liberalization measure following two similar decisions made on N ovem-
ber II and December 28, 1959. As result of this measure, a total of 433 
items will be included in the A.A. system as from April. As to the six 
limited import items from the United States, which are most important in 
liberalization, it is decided that iron scrap, beef tallow and lard will be put 
under the A.A. system as from April although the discrimination against 
refined lard will end after the scheduled tariff negotiations with the United 
States. Imports of skins will be freed in the first half of the fiscal year 
1960 at latest, and the discrimination against imports of soyabean will be 
removed around October. 
What is most important is the fact that the government decided to 
work out a plan for year~by-year stepped-up liberalization before the end of 
next May. The:.opinion is heard that the liberalization· ratio will amount 
to 40% in the first half of 1960, and 70% in the first half of 1961, but it 
is hoped that this plan will make this point clear. 
3. SOlne Problelns to be Considered in Connection 
with Liberalization 
Since the liberalization plan is still in the melting-pot, it won't be a 
responsible attitude to make an imprudent statement about the future of 
liberalization at this stage. Therefore, the author will only point out some 
points which are likely to come into question Sooner or later, while touching 
on some of the contents of the liberalization program. 
Let us begin with the liberalization of trade. As was pointed out 
already, the liberalization of trade now at issue means the freeing of the 
control over exchange accompanied with trade. The trade control that has 
been in practice until today is not a kind of control that was exercised in 
old days for the purpose of protecting infant industries by tariffs. It is the 
control of trade through the control of exchange, and therefore, the libera-
lization of trade as the word goes does not mean the sort of thing which 
we used to call "free trade". Instead, it means the freeing of the exchange 
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control. And as it is clear from what we have said in the foregoing, libera-
lization means an increased ratio of the items listed under the automatic 
approval system to those listed under the foreign currency budget allocation 
system, With this change in the ratio, the importation of raw materials, 
semi-finished products and finished products becomes easier to the importers. 
How could this shifting become possible? Needless to say, it was only be-
cause the foreign currency holding of our country grew abundant. So, it is 
quite likely the liberalization program will stagnate or dwindle should the 
international balance of payments turn unfavorable to our country and the 
foreign currency holding fall off in the course of economic growth or in the 
process of business fluctuation. Granting that all other conditions remain 
constant, a higher level of economic growth tends, generally speaking, to 
create a greater demand for imports. Hence, it is quite possible that the 
liberalization program will run into a trouble if exports do not expand in 
proportion as imports increase. The government is now working on a ten-
year income-doubling program, according to which a high rate of economic 
growth is expected. An accurate measurement should be taken as to the 
relation between the income-doubling program and the liberalization program. 
The liberalization of today was started in the height of business pros-
perity after May 1958. This is the point which distinguishes it from the 
liberalization effected by means of the lifting of the gold· embargo in the 
midst of the panic of 1930. Besides, the business fluctuation of the present 
day assumes a considerably different form of manifestation under state mo-
nopolistic capitalism. The business policy through the instrumentality of the 
state power served to shorten the waves of prosperity and depression, and 
the postwar capitalism has not undergone any serious, and classical type 
panic as the prewar capitalism often experienced. But it would be wrong 
to make a hasty conclusion that we shall have no more panic. As long as 
capitalism exists, business fluctuation is unavoidable. Besides, the business 
policy backed up by the strong state power is gradually losing its influence, 
just because there is a limit to the competency of our nation to bear the 
financial burdens. If such being the case, we should be well prepared for 
the time when the present prosperity will sooner or later· give place to de-
pression, no matter whether we can or cannot say exactly when such time 
is due since very limited materials are only available for our judgment. In 
such days of depression, the foreign currency holding may develop alarming 
symptons due to inactivated exports. In planning the liberalization program, 
it is required that the men in charge should have the prospect as accurate 
as possible as to the future tendency of business. Although the tempo of 
the liberalization policy may be quickened or may run slow in the course 
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of business fluctuation in this manner, what I want to emphasize is that in 
either case the exchange control will continue to exist in the background. 
If one knows that today's liberalization is the liberalization under state mo-
nopolistic capitalism, he must be able to understand this as a matter of 
course. 
In the next place, let us consider the relation of the liberalization of 
trade to individual firms. It is correctly pointed out by many people that 
the liberalization of trade will expose the Japanese firms hitherto kept under 
hothouse protection by the exchange control to severe international competi-
tion. Some people are very optimistic about the future, believing that the 
constitutional improvement of individual industries is bound to be attained 
on the principle of economic rationalism, but the problem is not so easy as 
they think. When the discrepancy between superior and inferior industries 
becomes larger as a result of liberalization, there will be some such industries 
of comparatively inferior competitive power, that is, those which are likely 
to be beaten down by foreign competition, that are playing an important 
role in the field of employment in Japanese economy. As for these indus-
tries, the need for protective tariffs or the like measures will be voiced. 
As was pointed out many times already, today's liberalization of trade means 
the emancipation from the exchange control, hence it is not inconsistent 
with tariff policy. In comparison with the old free trade that was opposed 
to protective trade, today's liberalization differs from it on this point. It 
be acknowledged, however, that there is a limit to tariff policy, must bec_ 
ause as a member nation of GATT, Japan has its own limitations in 
raising tariffs for the protection of her industries. The tariff rates of our 
country which were fixed in 1951 are counted among the low tariff rates of 
the world, and it is universally known that there are many other defects 
and objectionable points other than this in our economy. As liberalization 
progresses, the revision of the tariffs will come to the front as a problem 
of primary importance. 
The liberalization of foreign exchange consists of the liberalization of the 
working account and that of the capital account. The working account may 
be classified into the trade account and the non-trade account, or divided 
into the non-resident account and the resident account. It was referred to 
already that the declaration of liberalization issued on January 12 confirmed 
that the decision was made to materialize the liberalization of not only the 
trade account but also the non-trade account shortly. Also it is evident from 
some European examples that the liberalization trend will gradually extend 
from the non-resident account to the resident account. What is important 
ON JAPAN'S LIBERALIZATION OF TRADE AND EXCHANGE 27 
here is, I think, the liberalization of the capital accout," It is important 
that the liberalization of the working account is possible without necessita-
ting the revision of "the Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Control 
Law" nor" the Law concerning Foreign Capital" and by making a few 
alterations on the method of administration of these laws, while the liberaliza-
tion of the capital account necessitates the revision of these laws. Also, when 
one speaks about the liberalization of capital, the inflow of foreign capital 
comes to our mind as a main issue at the present stage. Indeed, it is a 
matter of great importance to question how the introduction of foreign capital 
will affect our economy. It is told that a plan to ease the limitation of 
free acquirement of stocks by foreign investors from the current rate of 5-
8% to 10-15% is now under consideration. Some people are afraid that 
such easing of the introduction of foreign capital into Japan would inevitably 
subordinate the Japanese economy to foreign capital, while some others do 
not take it so seriously and believe that the introduction of foreign capital 
never reach to such a scale as some people are concerned about, and that the 
subordinatIon of Japanese economy to foreign capital would never become a 
problem. It is impossible at this stage to give any definite opinion as to 
which view of the two is correct, and the author only suggests that there 
are two such different opinions. 
4. Liberalization and Different Classes 
Some of the effects of liberalization have already appeared, and more 
of them are expected to come out soon. Here the author will give a brief 
consideration to the effects at large. "How will the liberalization of trade 
change Japan's economy" edited by the Diamond considers the effects of 
liberalization by classifying our industries into the following types: namely, 
the backward type industries (the primary industries such as agricultural 
industry, and mining industry), the .international standard type industries, the 
transition to growth type industries, and the excessive competition type in-
dustries. The approach is very interesting.') Also, the Investigation Depart-
ment of the Japan Industrial Bank has been conducting a useful investiga-
tion on "the liberalization of trade and key industries ".') With the assis-
tance of these informations as his reference, the author wishes to look into 
the effects of liberalization from a somewhat different view-point. 
4) The Liheralization of Capital Transactions and the Stock Market, by the Investigation 
Department, Nomura Securities Co. 
5) How wilt the liberalization of trade change Japan's econnmy?, edited by the Diamond 
p. 113, seq. 
6) The liberalization of trade and key industries, by the Investigation Department, The Japan 
Industrial Bank. 
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Monopolistic Capitalist 
An idea prevails that today's liberalization was initiated under the pres-
sure of foreign countries and on the initiative of monopolistic capitalists wi-
thin our country. The idea itself is not wrong, but for the sake of accuracy, 
it may be necessary to make some explanation. There is no question that 
giant industries with strong financial power are naturally stronger in inter-
national competition in the matter of cost. Although we say in one word 
"monopolistic capitalist industry ", there are many different kinds. For 
example you can look at the the difference between the textile and the 
iron and steel industries. According to the classification of the Diamond, 
textile industry is put under the category of the excessive competition type 
industry. In point of cost and price, the industry has been known from old 
as an industry equipped with sufficient power to compete with foreign cou-
ntries, and has always been the leader of free trade. Because of this fact, 
we have a good reason to believe that the consequence of liberalization will 
be excessive competition in the industry, and the problem of how to adjust 
surplus equipment in its chronic state will come to assume a grave aspect. 
To speak of the iron and steel industry, it is on or near the international 
level in respect of cost, and is classified as an international standard type 
industry according to the Diamond. In terms of comparative production 
cost, the iron and steel industry may well be ranked at the border line bet-
ween relatively superior industries and relatively inferior industries. It is safe 
to say that it is a result of her constitutional improvement made possible 
through the renewal of equipment after the war that the iron and steel 
industry that could survive the prewar years under the protection of. the 
government has grown strong enough to stand on her own feet. The ques-
tion of how far will our iron and steel industry be able to debouch into 
foreign markets as an export industry through liberalization may have the 
key to determine the success or failure of our liberlization program. Al-
though we call them monopolistic industries without distinction, we now 
saw that they were not necessarily the same in contents. If and when we 
take these differences into our consideration, we may safely support the idea 
that monopolistic capital is the promoter of liberalization. 
Mediul11 and Sl11all-sized Industries 
Although we say "medium and small-sized industries" in one word, 
there are very many kinds of such industries that fall under the same cate-
gory, and quite naturally the effects of liberalization upon them would not 
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always be the same. It is pointed out that liberalization is unfavorable to 
medium and small-sized industries as a whole, but there are some such in-
dustries among them that rank superior in order of comparative production 
cost, These superior industries are expected to debouch further into foreign 
markets through liberalization. For instance, a part of mechanical industry 
such as transistor radio, sewing machine or camera. However, the greater 
part of mechanical and chemical industries come under the heading of the 
transition to growth type industry according to the classification devised by 
the Diamond, and are expected to suffer considerably when they will be 
confronted by fiercer competition that liberalization will bring about. Even 
in textile, and iron and steel industries which have been believed to be 
strong enough to compete with foreign industries, this general belief only 
applies to large scale enterprises. and not to the so-called medium and small-
sized enterprises. This may be well explained by the fact that middle and 
small textile manufacturers started a strong movement against the govern-
ment measure when the decision was made on December 26 last year to 
include raw cotton and wool in the list of the automatic approval items as 
from April 1961. Perhaps nobody can deny that liberalization has a ten-
dency to provoke regimentation of middle and small capital by big capital, 
and to cause some middle and small enterprises to drop out of the business 
race. Even among those who support liberalization, the voice demanding 
effective government measures for the constitutional improvement of medium 
and small-sized industries is getting stronger. 
Agricultural Industry 
Most of our agricultural products such as rice, wheat and soyabean are 
far above their international price level, hence extremely weak in inter-
national competition. Therefore, this industry is regarded as a branch where 
liberalization will be delayed most or even be impossible. Some advocates 
of extreme economic rationalism insist that liberalization should be pushed 
as it is desirable for the future of Japan's ecnomy even if it demands 
some sacrifice now. In view of the fact that such radical industrializa-
tion has never been successful except in England of the 19th century, we 
can see that it won't be carried out so easily as they expect. It is be-
cause the primary industries such as agriculture and mining industry are 
playing an important role in the field of employment. How to raise the 
agricultural productivity without provoking employment difficulties remains a 
problem yet to be solved in future. Is it too pessimistic to think that libera-
lization will not be realized before the pending problem will have been 
solved? 
30 K. MATSUI 
The Laboring Class 
The labor unions and the progressive parties are strongly against libera-
lization. To see some of the reasons of their objection, the liberalization 
policy is inseparable from the revision of the Security Treaty; it is not a 
policy reached by Japan's own judgment, but a policy forced by America; 
it will be followed by a low wage policy as an inevitable consequence. Lay-
ing aside political problems, the author would like to point out the following 
points as the economic effects of liberalization upon the laboring class. Li-
beralization will necessarily intensify the international competition. The na-
tural consequence of it will be the enforcement of industrial rationalization 
policy. Industrial rationalization may tend to improve equipment and faci-
lities, but also may lead to a low wage policy, intensified labor and personnel 
cut. Some people contend that if we succeed in lowering cost by equipment 
and facilities improvement and so forth, it should be possible to bring down 
wage cost without resorting to low wage policy, and therefore, individual 
enterprises must do their best under liberalization towards this direction. 
Such contention may be acceptable merely as an abstract theory, but the 
important question for us is whether such measures could possibly be taken 
under today's capitalist economy. Of course, liberalization will not affect 
different industries in equal manner nor necessitate the same measures. Ac-
cordingly different will be the measures to be followed by the laboring class 
to cope with these different situations. Quite possibly the objection to 
liberalization will be the conclusion to be reached by the laboring class in 
the final analysis, but even so such objection will not be powerful enough 
unless it is accompanied by practical economic demands. 
